Eleventh Circuit Protects HR Managers from Retaliation for Opposing Discriminatory Practices

Eleventh Circuit Protects HR Managers from Retaliation for Opposing Discriminatory Practices

The 11th Circuit recently handed down an opinion saying “not so fast” to an employer that attempted to defend against Title VII retaliation claims by arguing that HR managers don’t qualify for protection. In Patterson v. Georgia Pac., LLC,¹ the Court denied an attempt to chip away at Title VII’s protections for those who engage in protected conduct, holding that all classes of employees who oppose Title VII violations or participate in attempts to root them out are protected from retaliation, no matter what their job duties are or what employer they happen to be working for at the time.

Jacqueline Marie Patterson was a human resources employee who left her previous position in that line of work at another company to accept a new one at Georgia Pacific. She was assigned to a cellulose mill in Alabama.

In her role for the previous company, management had consulted her prior to their termination of three pregnant employees. Ms. Patterson instructed management “not [to] do anything” until she could seek further advice, but management disregarded that and terminated their employment. The pregnant employees later filed a lawsuit against the company under the FMLA.

Around a year and a half after Patterson began working for Georgia Pacific, she was deposed as part of the pregnant employees’ lawsuit and testified that she had instructed the management employees not to terminate them. When her manager at Georgia Pacific found out about the deposition, he interrogated her about it, asking whether she had sided with the employees or the employer in the deposition. She stated that she’d testified “on behalf of the ladies,” to which her manager responded, that “[that] made things clear to him.” Just one week later, Georgia Pacific terminated her employment.² Ms. Patterson then filed a lawsuit against Georgia Pacific alleging that it terminated her in violation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful to terminate someone because they oppose discriminatory practices or because they participate in any investigation regarding the same.³ These protections are referred to as the “opposition clause” and the “participation clause.”

The district court granted summary judgment to Georgia Pacific on Ms. Patterson’s claim on two grounds. First, it held, that Ms. Patterson could not have partaken in “opposition conduct.” It reasoned that an HR manager cannot engage in protected activity while acting in relation to the normal course of her duties. It extracted this principle from an unpublished 11th Circuit opinion. Second, it held that Ms. Patterson’s participation in the deposition with her previous employer could not be protected activity because it did not concern her current job.⁴

Ms. Patterson appealed, and the 11th Circuit reversed, finding that she had engaged in protected conduct. Specifically, the Court reasoned that an HR manager’s opposition to a Title VII violation is no less an opposition than anyone else. In short, it rejected the principle that the employee’s job duties could limit him or her from protection for opposing discrimination. Similarly, the court rejected Georgia Pacific’s argument that the HR Manager lost protection from retaliation for participation in a deposition simply because the deposition did not involve her current employer.

This decision sets a positive precedent for retaliation claims that will permeate fact patterns beyond those involving HR employees or those who allege they engaged in protected activity for a previous employer. Indeed, the Court’s cold textual analysis and interpretations of the words “any employee” and “opposition” will make it all but impossible for employers to carve out many exceptions to Title VII’s anti-retaliation requirements based on aspirational interpretations of its texts or practical considerations.

1 38 F.4th 1336.

2 Id. at 1343.

3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

4 Georgia Pacific argued on appeal that Patterson had not established genuine issues of material fact on pretext and causation elements, but the Court disagreed.